Introduction
There is arguably no aspect of decentralisation since the promulgation of the Local Government Act in 1997, which has been more daunting and complex than the process of assigning functions between central and local governments in Lesotho. This process has not been realised effectively in Lesotho except for a few line ministries that haphazardly conceded to hand some of their functions to local authorities. When the country enacted the Local Government Act, the process of the assignment of functions was short-circuited by annexing two Schedules to the Act which embody the purported functions of local authorities.
'Nyane

Assignment of functions to local authorities in Lesotho
CJLG December 2016 59
This has done little to assist in the decentralisation of certain formerly centralised functions. There are two main challenges with the Schedules. First, they are still too general to guide line ministries on the functions that rightfully belong to the sub-national level. Consequently, line ministries are largely left unguided on what functions to retain and what to relinquish. Secondly, and most importantly, the Schedules do not encompass revenue and expenditure functions. In turn, they have created empty hopes on the side of local government. Most of the developmental functions that have been envisaged remain without resources so that they largely constitute 'unfunded mandates'. The adoption of the National Decentralisation Policy in 2014 (Government of Lesotho 2014), has injected fresh impetus to the decentralisation reforms in Lesotho. It provides another opportunity to attempt the exercise of assigning functions to local authorities under the broader new policy regime. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to recast the whole notion of assignment of functions into the current reform processes. By so doing, the paper hopes to lay bare some of the challenges of this exercise in the past, and make some contributions on how it can be improved under the new policy regime.
Background to decentralisation in Lesotho
Decentralisation in Lesotho is arguably as old as the formation of the nation-state in the 19 th century.
Since then the country has experienced localised forms of democracy associated with traditional leadership under the system of chieftainship embedded in local governance processes (Mahao 1993 ).
This system was disrupted with the advent of democracy in the 1930s when the institution of chieftaincy was gazetted (Machobane 1986) , and later in the 1960s when an attempt was made at electing district councils, thereby infusing elective conceptions into the system of local governance. Since then, due largely to changing political situations in the country, local governance has oscillated between traditionalist, elective and appointive constructs.
Thus, Lesotho is traditionally a decentralised state where every village or ward has had a traditional administration of one form or another (Mofuoa 2005) . The post-independence institutional designs placed a lot of pressure on traditional administration to the extent that it -perhaps in tandem with all other native processes -showed some signs of inadequacy. The introduction in the 1960s of the elective principle in local governance also confirmed that a new attitude towards local democracy in Lesotho was on the upsurge. However, the concept of democracy could not be sustained, largely because of its rudimentary stage at the time. Instead of re-energising traditional administration, the country introduced the appointive principle in local administration in the late 1980s to early 1990s at a stage when the country was en route to democracy again. The idea of development councils at village and ward levels in the 1990s underscored this particular trajectory.
When the country returned to electoral democracy in 1993, local democracy followed in 1997 when the country re-introduced the elective principle to local governance through the Local Government Act of 1997. There has been widespread disagreement about the model of decentralisation introduced by the At present, the country operates a local government structure which has four types of local authorities:
community councils, district councils, urban councils and a municipal council (Table 1) . The community council is the basic unit of local government in Lesotho and number 64 in total. The members of the community council directly represent a single-member electoral division (ED); however, the ED is not necessarily a local government structure despite the fact that it covers a sizeable population in a community council. District councils are indirectly elected and made up of members nominated from every community council in the district. All ten administrative districts in Lesotho have district councils. Urban councils govern the 11 selected urban centres across the country and unlike district councils, are directly elected. The last type of local authority is the sole municipality based in Maseru city.
The challenge with this structure is that it is still not 'local enough' (Kapa 2009) . The community council which is the basic unit of the structure serves too many villages and some villages struggle to establish efficient relationships with the community council. The ideal situation would be for local government to have a local authority in every village.
Since the return of the country to electoral democracy, two local government elections have been held in 2005 and 2011. Throughout this period, emphasis has been placed on political decentralisation during the preliminary stages in the decentralisation process. Despite the large emphasis placed on 'political processes', there are some indications that local government in Lesotho is bracing for the second wave -the stage where local government would be given power to control its own resources, although population sizes differ (Table 2 ). This stage involves independent mobilisation of resources by local authorities, independent budgetary powers and control of facilities under which they would have the power to impose local taxes and collect local revenues (Hountondji and Fournier 2007) as accounting authorities in their own right. The local government regime in Lesotho has not yet reached this stage but there is every indication that this will soon be realised.
The Deepening Decentralisation Programme by the government of Lesotho in collaboration with European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), has as one of its key outputs the establishment of a local development fund which will transfer revenue from central government to local government. While doing so, the programme aims to create capacity at the local level to collect, receive and manage revenue. Clearly it would seem that the government has already realised that in order to graduate to this stage certain macro reforms will be necessary. The government is responding by starting the process of developing the decentralisation policy which will be the bedrock for all the reforms.
While the country will be working on its move to the second stage of decentralisation, it will be imperative to concurrently consider the third stage -that of local economic development. This is clearly an advanced stage of decentralisation where there is economic activity at the local level -the regulation of markets, participation of the private sector, economic regulations and frameworks, and production etc. (Hountondji and Fournier 2007) . This stage has its own reversals -negative tendencies like corruption, nepotism and cronyism are normally endemic during this period. concentration. Devolution is concerned more with the transfer of political power since authority is transferred by central governments to the local level. The sub-national or local authorities to which power has been transferred are governed by locally elected representatives -they are not necessarily agents of branches of central government (Conyers 1983) . The process of devolution is normally more straightforward in federal or semi-federal states where the centre is clearly not in charge of the regions or communes. Unitary states like Lesotho do not normally provide good examples of government with devolved powers (Salmon 1999) . On the other hand, de-concentration -which is common in Britishbased local government regimes -is not necessarily based on locally elected political representatives.
Power is simply transferred from the centre to the local branches of government, and the centre has direct control over the localised branches (Schou and Haug 2005) . This is commonly referred to as administrative decentralisation.
What becomes immediately apparent with the Lesotho design is that it does not fall squarely into either of these two designs. While indeed the local authorities are directly elected, there is still a lot of power and influence from the centre -which makes it hard for this process to be called devolution. 
The state of functional assignment in Lesotho
The nature of the model of decentralisation and the corollary assignment of functions can best be understood from the constitution of the country. Section 106 of the constitution empowers parliament to establish local authorities in order "to enable urban and rural communities to determine their affairs and to develop themselves". Unlike in other countries where the assignment of powers and functions to various spheres of government is a constitutional matter, the constitution of Lesotho does not necessarily deal with the assignment of functions to local authorities. Assignment of functions is a matter for legislation. The Local Government Act of 1997 is the organic piece of legislation on decentralisation and local governance in Lesotho. The Act establishes political structures in the form of councils that are elected directly by the citizenry. The legislative powers of these councils are limited to making by-laws (s 42) but subject to approval by the minister (s 44). Section 5 of the Act, although it is couched in fairly broad terms, is instructive on the powers of local authorities in Lesotho. In terms of section 5(2) of the Act, community councils perform exclusively the functions in the Second
Schedule. The section is fairly permissive on what the local authorities can or cannot do. The functions are demarcated in terms of the two Schedules attached to the Act in section 5 (see Table 3 below). There is an advantage in taking this general competence approach in constructing the powers of the local authorities -but there are also disadvantages. The advantage is that local authorities are given sufficient scope to do generally everything within their area of jurisdiction. However, the disadvantage is that when the functions of local authorities are assigned in general terms, it leaves room for misunderstanding and abuse. The net effect becomes stagnation in the process of decentralisation -the central government remain suspicious about the capabilities of the local authorities. Similarly, local governments become beholden to central government about what they can or cannot do. As it could be observed from Table 3 above, the Schedules do not specify the extent to which a local authority can deliver or execute a certain function. For instance, local authorities are empowered to administer education. The Schedules do not necessarily differentiate between various levels of educationuniversity, secondary, primary or pre-school. In the end, the central government retains powers to control, administer and deliver education services in all these levels of education. The same applies with roads, agriculture, and forestry and even water resources.
This general competence approach used in the Lesotho design is normally juxtaposed with ultra vires (beyond legal limits). This approach provides a list of functions that can be executed by local authorities and those that can be executed by the central government with some level of specificity. The net effect is that no sphere of government can encroach into the jurisdictional authority of the other for that will be clearly be ultra vires or beyond the law (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2009) . In Lesotho's design the disadvantage is that there are no clear legal boundaries to prohibit one sphere of government from encroaching into the jurisdiction of the other in as far as service delivery is concerned. The design allows concurrent functional assignment -the assignment of functions in which spheres of government share functions and competences. Concurrency in functional assignment is not necessarily a bad thing when properly managed. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, the two spheres of government can be given competences on one functional area such as roads or agriculture, and the lower level is given actual execution and delivery while the higher level is given regulation and standard-setting.
Another disadvantage with the Schedules, as shown in Table 3 , is that they do not assign revenue and expenditure functions to local authorities. While the Act empowers the local authorities to collect revenue and expend it, functions are not assigned accordingly between the two spheres of government. 
Despite this statutory intervention by the Minister, transfer of functions to the local authorities in
Lesotho is still very low. Even in those ministries that are making some attempt to transfer functions, resources such as finances and human resources are still retained by the central government to the extent that transfer of these functions ultimately becomes an exercise in futility.
Overview of fiscal decentralisation in Lesotho
Conceptually, fiscal decentralisation is the concomitant of the now widely accepted wave of decentralisation across the globe. It therefore subscribes to the broader theories of decentralisation whose essence is that decentralisation leads to higher levels of political participation, accountability, administrative and fiscal efficiency (Falleti 2005; Inter-American Development Bank 1994) . Countries have differed materially on how they decentralise public financial management. The difference has largely depended on the model of decentralisation which a country proposes. Other countries, mainly federal and semi-federal countries, have opted for much more devolved powers to the sub-national level while unitary states largely maintain vertical uni-polar fiscal relationships between tiers of government.
Public financial management responsibilities are assigned to various tiers of government but largely managed through one central system. Irrespective of the model of decentralisation, every country in contemporary country designs has one form of fiscal decentralisation or the other (Faguet 2014 ).
In essence, fiscal decentralisation means empowering local and sub-national spheres of government to manage their fiscal resources. Due largely to weak local revenue in most instances, fiscal decentralisation has been erroneously equated to transfers from the central government to the periphery. Admittedly, fiscal decentralisation in Lesotho is still in its infancy and appears to be lagging behind administrative and political decentralisation. However, the Local Government Act (1997) empowers every council to collect revenue and manage it within its jurisdiction. The revenue collection powers of councils seem to be broad enough to include fines and penalties; inter-governmental transfers; rates and taxes (s 47). However, no council has been managing any revenue in Lesotho with the exception of The policy is not specific on the model of assignment of functions, but it can only be deduced from the principles of the policy that local autonomy, a subject which has haunted decentralisation in Lesotho for a very long time, is central to the newly envisaged dispensation. 
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion highlights that the subject of assignment of functions to local authorities in Lesotho continues to be a fairly complex subject which will haunt decentralisation for quite some time.
Assignment of functions to sub-national structures is essential to any decentralisation project which in turn becomes the key pillar of constitutional democracy. As it has been established, local government is not the integral theme of the constitution of Lesotho. Section 106 of the constitution only cursorily leaves it to parliament to establish local authorities. The weakness with this approach is that the separation of local and central spheres of government is a constitutional issue. Thus, the lofty principles Government Bill proposes to take the functions out of the Schedules to the Act into the Regulations.
While the Bill proposes to deepen decentralisation in the country, it is criticisable for taking the functions from the Act into Regulations. That is tantamount to watering-down the provisions.
Functional assignment is central to decentralisation and as such deserves space at constitutional level.
With the mooted constitutional reforms, the country should recast central-local relations in the new constitution.
